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1. Introduction 
The debate about reforms of the EU budget and the system of own resources has a long history. 
Many reform proposals have been made. Some of them are restricted to marginal adjustments of 
the existing system, others suggest fundamental change. Public spending and taxation belong 
to the core of state sovereignty. Therefore, reforms of the EU financing system have to be seen 
against the backdrop of the particular institutional setup of the EU. 
The EU is a unique institution. It combines governance structures known from international or-
ganisations with elements of federalism. In the area of public finance, the current setup is based 
on the fiscal sovereignty of the member states. In particular, national parliaments have the right 
to levy taxes, and there is currently no consensus in sight that this should change. This paper 
makes a reform proposal which takes the fundamental institutional setup of the EU as given. How-
ever, assuming that the current institutional structure of the EU remains in place does not mean 
that it will not evolve in the future. Nor does it mean that the current division of powers and re-
sponsibilities between EU institutions needs to remain exactly as it is. In fact we do think that 
there is need for change. The current system for the financing of the EU needs to be reformed. 
There is need for change on the revenue and the expenditure side of the budget. A reform of the 
system needs to address various institutional issues, in particular the roles played by the Council 
and the European Parliament.
In this paper we propose a reform of the EU financing system. The two most important elements of 
our proposal are i) to make the contribution of taxpayers to the EU budget more visible by showing 
an EU VAT share on receipts and ii) to increase the power of the European Parliament in the deter-
mination of the structure of EU expenditures by limiting the multiannual financial framework to the 
overall size of the EU budget while the structure of expenditures will be determined annually. It is 
the objective of the second reform element to give greater weight to policies with EU wide benefits 
and to crowd back the influence of ‘juste retour’ thinking on EU expenditures.
The setup of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we briefly summarize the current structure of 
EU revenues and expenditures. Section 3 discusses the critique of the current system and per-
spectives for reform. In section 4, we present our reform proposal and section 5 concludes.
The current system 
needs to be reformed
Reform proposal
2. EU Finances: The Current System
Currently the EU budget is essentially financed through the system of own resources.1 Own re-
sources are revenues which accrue to the EU and do not depend on discretionary decisions of 
member states. Own resources can be a share of custom duties or a share of some harmonized 
tax. The EU budget is always balanced and the level of expenditures is limited by the expenditure 
ceilings fixed in the multiannual financial framework, which currently covers the time span 2014-
2020. For this period the expenditure ceiling has been set to 1.23 per cent of gross national in-
come (GNI). There are three types of own resources:
 ͮ The so called traditional own resources (TOR), consisting of customs duties and agricultural 
levies,
 ͮ the VAT based resource, which is essentially a contribution by the member states calculated 
with reference to a hypothetical value added tax base with various corrections, and
 ͮ the GNI based resource, which balances the budget.
Figure 1 illustrates the weight of the different revenue sources in the EU budget. Over time the 
VAT resource has lost importance while the weight of the GNI resource has increased.
The expenditure side of the budget has traditionally been dominated by agricultural subsidies 
and spending on cohesion, i.e. regional and structural policies. Although the role of agricultural 
subsidies has declined over time, they still absorb roughly 40 per cent of the budget. Expenditure 
on cohesion policies is the other large block in the budget (see figure 2).
How is the financing burden distributed across member states? Figure 3 illustrates how a coun-
try’s share in the contribution to the EU budget is related to its share in EU GNI. The contributions 
are roughly proportional to GNI but some countries show deviations.2 
1 Next to these own resources, the EU has other revenues, which include, for instance, taxes on salaries of EU staff, fines for breaches of EU 
regulations or contributions from non EU countries which participate in certain EU programs.
2 Croatia joined the EU in July 2013 so that the number is distorted since the contributions reflect membership during six months while the 
GNI number is for the whole year. 
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Figure 2: EU Budget Expenditure 2013 (Billion Euro)
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Figure 3: EU Budget Financing Share/GNI Share 2013
Figure 4: EU Budget Net Balances 2012 (% of GNI)
The budget net balance is defined according to the financial report methodology of the European Commission. The net operating balance (after UK rebate) of each 
Member State is established by calculating the difference between the operating expenditure (excluding administration) allocated to each Member State, and 
the adjusted ‘national contribution’ of each Member State. For more detailed information, please refer to: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/financialreport/2013/
annex/3/index_en.html.
A different picture emerges when net balances are considered. Figure 4 (see page 3) shows the 
net balances in per cent of GNI for the year 2012. Net balances do to a large extent reflect that 
the financial flows of the EU budget favor the poorer member states. 
To summarize, figures 1-4 illustrate four stylized facts about the EU budget: i) the growing impor-
tance of GNI contributions and the declining role the VAT based own resource, ii) the large weight 
of redistributive expenditures in the form of agricultural subsidies and regional and structural 
policy funds, iii) the fact that the financing contributions of the member states are not exactly 
proportional to GNI and certainly not progressive in per capita GNI and iv) the fact that net bal-
ances are in most cases inversely related to prosperity.
3. The Critique of the Status Quo and the Need for Reform
There is a consensus among a large number of both policy makers and academics that EU poli-
cies should focus on areas where common interests of the member states are at stake and where 
the EU can achieve policy objectives more effectively than the member states acting alone. The 
costs of these policies should be distributed fairly. At the same time the EU budget should be as 
transparent and democratically accountable as possible. Citizens should understand what they 
contribute to the EU budget and what they get in return. 
The existing financing system is often criticized for failing to achieve these objectives. The cri-
tique can be summarized in four points: 
Firstly, the EU spends its money on the wrong policies.3 Some of the largest spending items in 
the EU budget are difficult to justify. This includes in particular the huge share of spending on 
agriculture. There is no convincing reason why the EU should spend 40 per cent of its budget on 
a sector of declining importance. But there is more. As shown in the preceding section, the sec-
ond largest item in the EU budget is spending on regional and structural policies. This is justifi-
able when it comes to the development of border crossing activities like infrastructure networks 
or when regional policy subsidies go to poor EU member states. But many projects are carried out 
in countries that do not need EU support. For instance, the EU has recently co-financed the reno-
vation of drinking water reservoirs in Brandenburg, Germany.4 Drinking water is important but the 
benefits of the renovation are restricted to the local area, and there is no doubt that Germany has 
the means to finance the renovation of drinking water tanks. No border crossing interests arise 
and there is no wider European interest in this investment. Other examples are the transforma-
tion of disused industrial sites in Nuremberg, Bavaria5, or the support of IT investment of small 
and medium enterprises in Baden-Württemberg.6 Similar cases can be found in many EU coun-
tries.
At the same time, more EU involvement would be required in the provision of EU wide public goods. 
This includes areas like foreign policy, external and internal security, military procurement and de-
velopment aid. These are policy fields where individual member states have neither the incentives 
nor the resources to act appropriately. Here, the EU could generate added value, generate impor-
tant efficiency improvements and make sure that European interests are represented effectively.7 
3 This verdict is a common thread of numerous analyses that apply fiscal federalism criteria to the EU budget: Alesina and Wacziarg (1999), 
Sapir Report (2004), Alesina et al. (2005), Heinemann and Begg (2006), ECORYS et al. (2008), Ederveen et al. (2008).
4 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index.cfm/en/projects/germany/drinking-water-reservoir-gets-new-lease-of-life, downloaded May 2, 
2015.
5  http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index.cfm/en/projects/germany/a-second-chance-for-disused-industrial-sites, May 2, 2015.
6  http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index.cfm/en/projects/germany/getting-businesses-moving-with-it, May 2, 2015.
7  For the potential of cost savings through a europeanization of defense and embassies or consulates see Weiss (2013).
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The fact that these policies are neglected while the redistributive policies dominate is often ex-
plained by the circumstance that regional policy projects or agricultural subsidies lead to visible 
benefits in individual member states while the benefits of the provision of EU wide public goods 
are less directly visible (e.g. de la Fuente and Doménech, 2001; Osterloh et al., 2009). National 
governments, who dominate decision making at the EU level through the Council, have incentives 
to use their political influence to make sure that their country gets a ‘fair share’ of these spending 
items. Lending political support to spending on EU wide public goods is less attractive. 
Under the current decision rules the Council has a particularly strong position vis-à-vis the Parlia-
ment through its crucial first draft of the multiannual financial framework (MFF). Although the MFF 
requires the subsequent consent from the Parliament, the experience with the decision on the 
2014-2020 MFF once again indicates that the initial Council position creates facts which can on-
ly marginally be changed by the Parliament in the further proceedings. Moreover, since the MFF 
broadly defines the expenditure structure it also constrains the possibilities of the Parliament to 
shift resources towards European public goods in the course of the annual budget legislation. 
This relatively weak position of the Parliament compared to the Council helps to explain the per-
sistence of redistributive policies with large national visibility, rather than spending on items of 
EU wide interest. There is evidence that the net-receiver and net-payer positions explain prefer-
ences and coalition formation in the Council much better than the party orientation of national 
governments (Zimmer et al., 2005; Rant and Mrak, 2010). By contrast, for the voting behavior in 
the Parliament transnational party lines are more important (Hix 2002; Hix and Noury, 2008; Hix 
et al. 2007; Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999). Accordingly, as long as the “national” Council effective-
ly has a larger say in budgetary issues than the “partisan” Parliament it is unlikely that the ‘juste 
retour’ thinking will lose impact. 
A second point of critique is the argument that the burden sharing between member states is un-
fair. As shown in figure 3, some of the more prosperous EU member states contribute less to the 
EU household than what corresponds to their share in EU wide GNI. In particular the rebate for 
the United Kingdom is often criticized as being unfair because it no longer reflects the distribu-
tion of prosperity in the EU. At the same time, the UK and other countries point to the fact that 
net balances do suggest that the EU budget redistributes significantly in favor of the poor mem-
ber states. Clearly, if a larger part of the budget was spent on EU wide public goods, rather than 
redistributive items with local impact only, net balances would be less relevant as an indicator 
of how individual member states benefit from the EU budget.
The third point of critique is that the existing financing system is unnecessarily complex and 
opaque. This applies in particular to the VAT based resource. It is essentially a contribution by 
the member states, but its calculation is extremely complex. It is clearly less transparent than the 
GNI resource. Another source of opacity is the system of national rebates. In particular the calcu-
lation of the rebate for the United Kingdom is complex. Since it is linked to the VAT based own 
resource, reforms of this particular own resource are difficult to achieve.
Finally, the fourth issue is a lack of democratic accountability and the absence of a direct link be-
tween the EU budget and European citizens. Most citizens are poorly informed about the magni-
tude of the budget and the tax burden associated with it. Also benefits of at least some forms of 
spending are far from being well-known.8 The lacking transparency on the costs of EU activities 
precludes a comprehensive and balanced cost-benefit calculation on the side of voters. 
8  Some forms of spending are very visible, in particular infrastructure spending where EU involvement is usually well advertised.
EU financing system  
is unnecessarily 
complex and opaque 
4. A Reform of the EU Financing System
We propose a reform of the EU financing system which addresses the weaknesses of the system 
but, at the same time, does not require a fundamental change in the institutional setup of the EU, 
as mentioned in the introduction. In particular, our proposal does not question the sovereignty 
of the member states in the area of taxation. Most individual elements of our reform proposal 
have been discussed or proposed in other contexts. The key issue is that their combination leads 
to a concept which we believe to be well balanced. Our proposal includes five elements: 
 ͮ The decision on the MFF should in future be limited to the budget ceiling. Hence, the Council 
will continue to have a strong say on the level of spending, but will lose its power to predeter-
mine the spending structure for the full duration of the MFF. Decisions on how to spend the 
money (up to the pre-determined ceiling) will be completely left to the annual budgetary pro-
cedure with its joint decision making of Council and Parliament. 
 ͮ The existing VAT own resource will be abolished.
 ͮ The traditional own resources will be preserved. The GNI based resource will compensate the 
revenue losses due to the abolition of the VAT based resource. 
 ͮ All EU member states will make the contribution of citizens to the EU budget visible on VAT re-
ceipts by showing some percentage points of VAT labelled as the EU share in VAT. The purpose 
of this ‘EU VAT rate’ is exclusively to make the financing burden of the EU budget visible to the 
citizens. It shall not to be the basis of real financial flows. This could happen at a later reform 
stage, as we point out further below, but not currently. There are two options for determining 
the ‘EU-VAT rate’. The first option would be to make the respective national contribution visi-
ble. The true national contribution to the overall budget would take the form of the GNI based 
own resource. The VAT rate shown on the receipt would simply translate the national GNI based 
contribution into the EU VAT rate. The second option would be to determine the EU VAT rate by 
translating the GNI contributions of all member states into an EU-wide and uniform EU-VAT 
rate. The advantage of the first option is that the EU VAT rate would illustrate the true contribu-
tion citizens of any country make to the EU budget. Maybe a disadvantage is that the EU VAT 
rate would then differ across member states. The second option would avoid this and the EU 
VAT rate would be the same in the entire EU. The disadvantage would be that the true contri-
bution per member state would not be reflected in the EU VAT rate. We prefer option 2 because 
it could be interpreted as illustrating the contribution of taxpayers as EU citizens, not as citi-
zens of their respective member states. 
 The rate could be adjusted each year or less frequently, depending on how the budget and the 
tax base change. It is important to emphasize that showing the ‘EU tax’ on the receipts would 
not imply that member states would automatically pass on the VAT revenue to the EU. The dif-
ference between revenue from traditional own resources and the overall EU budget will be cov-
ered by GNI own resources. The EU share in VAT is exclusively an instrument for communica-
tion. If VAT harmonization proceeds, one option for the future would be to transform the EU 
VAT rate into a true own resource. But the reform we suggest here should not be postponed 
until VAT harmonization proceeds because that may last a long time.
 ͮ The system of rebates should be simplified. The rebates will ultimately be a matter of negotia-
tions. The net balances could provide a guideline, but expenditures without clearly identifiable 
benefits which accrue to individual member states should be left out of the calculation of net 
balances. 
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The five elements of 
the reform proposal
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This reform proposal offers a number of improvements. Abolishing the VAT based own resource 
and simplifying the system of rebates has been proposed repeatedly. Here, the key obstacle is 
that the UK rebate is linked to the VAT own resource. It will be difficult but hopefully not impos-
sible to convince the UK that change is necessary. 
The two more controversial elements of our proposal are the change in the budgetary process and 
the introduction of the EU VAT share which is made visible on invoices. Variants of both elements 
have been proposed by other authors.9
The limitation of the initial MFF decision to the spending ceiling would prevent the Council from 
effectively fixing the expenditure structure over seven years through its initial decision. Instead, 
the budgetary structure would then be negotiated by the partners Council and Parliament in the 
annual budgetary process with equal weights. This innovation would imply an increase of power 
for the Parliament regarding the structure of EU expenditures. It has the purpose to give greater 
weight to policies with EU wide benefits and to crowd back the influence of ‘juste retour’ think-
ing. As shown above there is evidence that national perspectives and interests are more influen-
tial in the Council than in the European Parliament.
Of course, we cannot preclude that members of the European Parliament focus on policies which 
favor their particular voters in their constituencies. This could lead to a process of logrolling with 
similar results as negotiations between national governments. However, voting on the budget is 
likely to happen along party lines, so that it will be difficult to organize the particular interests of 
individual members of the European Parliament.10 If that is correct, the greater influence of the Par-
liament in decision making about the expenditure structure will enhance both democratic account-
ability at the EU level and the weight attributed to expenditures on items of interest to Europe as a 
whole. This could imply a restructuring of expenditures away from agricultural sector spending to-
wards European infrastructure networks and internal and external security policies.
Without doubt, there is a need for multi-annual spending programs in order to develop long-run in-
vestment strategies like it is indispensable for cohesion spending or infrastructure. But this kind of 
long-run programming can be done in the annual budgeting, as well, and is no necessary element 
of the binding MFF. In most national budget systems no binding long-run budgetary plans exist but, 
nevertheless, annual spending follows well-defined long-run investment strategies.
Introducing an EU VAT share to be made visible on invoices is likely to be controversial for a num-
ber of reasons. It would undoubtedly raise transparency and awareness for the costs of the EU 
budget. The EU would need to justify the budget and citizens would engage more and be more 
interested in the decisions made by the European Parliament. One concern could be that the costs 
of EU policies would become more visible to citizens while the benefits might not. Here the great-
er power of the European Parliament regarding the structure of expenditure is important. Greater 
exposure to scrutiny by the public would go along with greater decision making powers. Increased 
pressures and critique of the budget would be welcome. EU spending would have to be explained 
better and the most likely outcome is that spending on questionable items, such as agricultural 
subsidies, would finally be crowded back. 
An important objection to the EU VAT share would be that it would simulate a form of taxation which 
is not real. This might give rise to misunderstandings. The alternative to just making the EU VAT 
share visible on invoices would be to introduce a real own resource in the form of a share in VAT 
which goes to the EU budget. The main obstacle is that, as mentioned above, the VAT is not fully 
9   Letting the European Council set the ceiling for the EU budget while the European Parliament determines the expenditure structure has 
been proposed, for instance, by Gros and Micossi (2005). Making the revenue side of the EU budget visible through a share in a national tax 
like VAT has been proposed by Caesar (2001), Schick and Märkt (2002) and, recently, Cipriani (2014). 
10 Two further institutional innovations could counterbalance the incentives of MEPs to attract funds for their local constituencies: first, 
pan-European party lists and, second, higher local or national co-financing rates. Pan-European party lists would foster a European 
perspective in election campaigns and higher co-financing helps to internalize the costs of local pork barrels.
European Parliament 
should have stronger 
say on expenditure 
structure
harmonized across Europe. As long as this is the case, individual countries would have incentives 
to exempt more goods from VAT so that their contribution to the EU budget declines. To address this 
issue the GNI own resource levied from each country could be calculated so that VAT own resources 
contributed in the country could be credited against the GNI resource. This would eliminate the in-
centive to narrow the VAT base. To the extent that VAT harmonization proceeds, the crediting against 
the GNI based resource could be reduced and eventually abolished. 
Back of the envelope calculations illustrate the new system (Figure 5): Translating national shares 
in own resource payments (including rebates, excluding traditional own resources) into country-
specific VAT shares (option 1) would lead to a range between 1.2 and 2.7 percentage points. A 
uniform EU-wide VAT tax share (option 2) would amount to 2.0 percentage points.
5. Conclusions
What does our reform proposal achieve? Two advantages are of key importance: Firstly, the shift 
of responsibility for the structure of EU spending to the European Parliament has the potential to 
reduce the focus on ‘juste retour’ and policies generating visible advantages in individual mem-
ber states. Instead, policy areas where interests of Europe as a whole are at stake and where EU 
involvement can yield added value may find more political support. Secondly, making the contri-
bution of taxpayers to the EU budget visible through an EU VAT share shown on VAT receipts would 
strengthen the links between citizens and the EU budget and foster debate and democratic ac-
countability.
Thus, this limited reform would already suffice to realize a major pay-off from an EU tax, which is 
cost transparency for voters. This substantial progress could be achieved without a cut-back of 
national tax sovereignty so that current political constraints are respected. At the same time, this 
reform would constitute an evolutionary step preparing the ground for a possibly more funda-
mental reform in the future with a true EU VAT.
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